THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (U. of Chicago Press: 1962, 2012), by Thomas S. Kuhn, p.77-78
“[O]nce it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place...that the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always basedupon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other....
“The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory...”By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly.They will devise numerous articulations and 'ad hoc' modifications of their theory in order to eliminate apparent conflict. Most of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature.If therefore these epistemplogical counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit a new and different analysis pf science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern... is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”
(NORMALCY—ANOMALY—ACCRETING REJECTION--NEW PARADIGM--TAUTOLOGY)
Monday, March 17, 2014
structure of scientific revolutions
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (U. of Chicago Press: 1962, 2012), by Thomas S. Kuhn, p.77-78
“[O]nce it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternative candidate is available to take its place...that the act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always basedupon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other....
“The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory...”By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly.They will devise numerous articulations and 'ad hoc' modifications of their theory in order to eliminate apparent conflict. Most of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature.If therefore these epistemplogical counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit a new and different analysis pf science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern... is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”
(NORMALCY—ANOMALY—ACCRETING REJECTION--NEW PARADIGM--TAUTOLOGY)
