ETHICS BY SPINOZA, EXCERPT..

ETHICS including IMPROVEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING, by Benedict de Spinoza (Prometheus Books, Amherst NY: 1677, 1989), pp.163-175 “Prop. XLIX. Love or hatred toward a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt toward a thing acting by necessity. “Prop. L. Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear. “Prop. LI. Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object. “Prop. LII. An object which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and which we conceive do not to have any property not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long, as an object which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself. “Prop. LIII. When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctiveness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity. “Prop. LIV. The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity. “Prop. LV. When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat. “Prop. LVI. There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are kinds of objects whereby we are affected. “Prop. LVII. Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of one individual differs from the essence of the other. “Prop. LVIII. Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us in so far as we are active. “Prop. LVIX. Among all emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are not which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain.”